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Mental Responsibility and the
Criminal Law -- A Defence
By Roy MORELAND*
SEVERAL YEARS ago the writer made a somewhat intensive study
of mental responsibility and the criminal law in connection with
the preparation of a text on The Law Of Homicide.' Although
research for the project was started with a preconceived idea that
"some changes should be made" in the existing law in the light of
modern insight and understanding in the field of mental disorder,
the study ended, in the main, with an acceptance of the status quo.
The only real change suggested was based upon an analogy to
the law of negligence. Negligence in the law is divided into three
degrees and one does not become liable criminally for a negligent
injury unless he is guilty of negligent conduct where the negli-
gence is of the second or third degree.2 In other words, negligence
on the "first plateau" results in civil liability only.3 So, likewise,
it was suggested that mental disorder be divided into degrees and
that criminal responsibility have a relation to such degrees. There
is nothing new or exciting in this suggestion, even in the field of
criminal law, and some states have incorporated the classification,
at least in part, into their law by accepting irresistible impulse as
a defense to crime, although most jurisdictions still insist on the
test in the Rule in McNaghten's Case.4 . All the more is the sug-
gestion unexciting to the psychiatrist or the psychologist. Mem-
bers of these professions have long recognized that mental dis-
orders differ in severity and they have categorized them partly on
Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Kentucky.
'Moreland, The Law Of Homicide 271, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis(1952).
2 Moreland, A Rationale Of Criminal Negligence 27 (1944).
8 A helpful chart showing the higher degrees of risk required for criminal
than for civil negligence may be found in Moreland, Law Of Homicide 32 (1952).
4 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The Rule in McNaghten's
Case is discussed in some detail, infra, at p. 218.
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that basis. The peculiar quirk which the writer applied to the
categorization of mental disorder into degrees, however, was to
apply the classification in reverse order. In other words, mental
disorder of a very high degree only-the kind of disorder described
in the test in McNaghten's Case-would be a defense to heinous or
atrocious crimes. This is because society is unwilling that those
who commit heinous crimes shall escape maximum punishment,
as punishment, by pleading some sort of "fringe" insanity. This
social attitude probably is an historic survivor of the vengeance
concept, but it undoubtedly exists in the public mind to a strong
degree in the case of atrocious crimes. In the case of lesser offenses
it was suggested that irresistible impulse constitute a defense on
the ground of "insanity." This would permit experimentation
with irresistible impulse-and perhaps some other fringe types of
mental disorder-as a defense in those jurisdictions which have
limited the test of insanity to the Rule in McNaghten's Case. The
application of such a categorization would provide, it was thought,
a compromise solution to the problem of irresistible impulse and
other fringe mental disorders which would probably be acceptable
to most jurisdictions. But the suggestion has not met with favor
except from a few loyal students!5
Now, once more, ten years later, the author is making a second
study of the defense of insanity in criminal cases. This effort is
occasioned by the fact that he has been selected to represent the
legal profession in a panel discussion of "Mental Responsibility."0
Other panelists represent the philosophical, psychological, psy-
chiatric and administrative viewpoints as to the social responsi-
bility of those having mental disorder.
Such a highly worthwhile group-participation discussion forces
the participants to take a much broader and more comprehensive
view of the problems involved than is customary when they discuss
or write about them for their individual professions. They must
make an effort to see the situation as those in these related fields
see it and they must attempt to draw conclusions and make sug-
gestions that will be more or less acceptable to all.
5 For a discussion of the suggestion, see Moreland, The Law Of Homicide 298
et seq. (1952). For an incorporation of the suggestion into a proposed statute, see
id. at 301 and 311.6 Panel on Mental Responsibility, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Program, Vet-
erans Administration Hospital, Lexington, Ky., May 10-11, 1956.
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Under such circumstances, the one who represents the legal
profession suffers considerable embarrassment. He knows that
those in other professions and the public generally consider that
the defense of insanity in criminal cases is administered badly.
Perhaps no other portion of the law has been criticized so severely,
unless it be the law's handling of divorce.
Confronted with such a situation, forced to face the shame
of the legal profession in public, how best can the one who repre-
sents the legal viewpoint meet the challenge? Should he be able to
convince his listeners that the criminal law deals with the problem
in a reasonably scientific and practical way? Can he present the
viewpoint of the law in such a way as to win the support and ap-
probation of those in these other professions? After considerable
reflection on such questions and on the problem, the writer has
decided to go upon the defensive. The framing of the criminal
law definition of mental irresponsibility has been substantially
affected by certain considerations and these should be taken into
account in any criticism of the existing law. A knowledge of these
considerations by those outside the legal profession will undoubt-
edly contribute materially to their understanding of the rule.
The test of mental responsibility used in the criminal law
has been determined largely by two circumstances, which must be
taken into account in understanding the test and the reason it is
worded as it is. To a large extent these two circumstances are
historic survivors; whether the present test should be continued
depends in the main upon whether these two historic survivors
have lost the reason for their being and so should be repudiated
or whether, on the other hand, there are valid reasons for their
continued existence.
(1) The Doctrine of Mens Rea.
The first factor which has affected the definition of "insanity"
as used in criminal cases is the doctrine of mens rea. Rightly or
wrongly, the American theory of criminal law is buttressed upon
the proposition that a crime is an anti-social act or omission,
committed or omitted, by one who is a free agent, who knows what
he is doing or failing to do and that it is wrong. The mental phase
of this definition is dominated by that most fundamental principle
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of the criminal law, the doctrine of mens rea. One cannot, except
in a few instances, be guilty of a crime unless he has mens rea-a
guilty mind.7 But one cannot have a guilty mind unless he under-
stands the nature and quality of his act and knows that he is doing
wrong. One cannot know that he is doing wrong unless he has the
mental capacity to tell the difference between right and wrong.
Now note the relationship between this analysis and the Rule
in McNaghten's Case, which is the test for insanity in the majority
of American jurisdictions. The test is, Did the accused have the
mental capacity to know the nature and quality of his act, or if
he did know it, did he know that it was wrong?8 This test fits
perfectly into the "guilty mind" theory of criminal responsibility.
Indeed, the test is framed in terms of "right and wrongl" So,
naturally, those who are the strongest proponents of the "guilty
mind" theory of criminal responsibility support the test of in-
sanity, at least in the main, as laid down in McNaghten's case.9
(2) The Dominance of the Jury.
The second compelling factor which has affected the definition
of insanity, as the word is used in the criminal law, is the fact that
the issue of mental capacity is determined by a jury, which is by
no means a panel of experts on mental disorder. But, the theory
of the law is that the jury need not be experts, the witnesses in the
case serve as the experts. The jury hears them, weighs their testi-
mony, and makes the decision. This is of course, an over-simpli-
fication-perhaps it is felt that experts are not really needed for
they do not appear at all in many cases-but it does represent a
somewhat pragmatic way of looking at the situation. Those who
administer the law would be the first to admit that there are other
and more scientific ways of trying complicated and highly tech-
nical issues of fact than by submitting them to a jury, but there
are other considerations that seem to call for its retention in
criminal cases.
Another factor, which ties in with and complicates the jury
circumstance, is the fact that the mental experts who appear as
7 Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Ml1. L. Rev. 117 (1922);
Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 Il. L. Rev. 578
(1923); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 974 (1932); Turner, The Mental Ele-
ment in Crimes at Common Law, 6 Camb. L. J. 31 (1936).
8 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 722-723 (1843).
9 See, for example, Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 536 (1947).
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witnesses in criminal cases are, unfortunately, paid witnesses, so
they take the side of the case from whence comes their fee. So-
called experts appear for the state and state positively that the
accused was mentally responsible for his acts at the time of the
crime; other so-called experts appear for the defendant and testify
directly to the contrary. This indicates either that the "experts"
are not expert or they would not vary so much-or that they are
not truthful. Such contradictions are bad for the professions which
they represent and for the law as well. The American trial system
is built upon the theory that witnesses shall tell the truth as they
know it; anything else makes the trial a farce.
A. An Appraisal of the Existing Situation.
The "right and wrong" test promulgated in McNaghten's Case
is more than a hundred years old. While this may indicate in and
of itself that the Rule is antiquated and needs rephrasing in the
light of modern science, it also indicates that it has withstood dis-
cussion, criticism, and ridicule for a long, long time and so must
have considerable merit. Indeed, it is highly arguable that the
test laid down in McNaghten's Case is fundamentally sound, par-
ticularly under our existing theory of crime and punishment. If
one who has a guilty mind is subject to punishment unless a jury
is willing to excuse his act or mitigate it, then, the Rule fits nicely
into the situation. The Rule, it may be argued, relieves all of
those unable to have a guilty mind; others, apparently, are beyond
the intended purview of our current theory of crime and punish-
ment in the majority of jurisdictions.
Moving on to the jury phase of the problem, it would be dif-
ficult, it is submitted, to find a substitute test of insanity which
would be simple and understandable enough to be administered
by a jury of ordinary laymen. Of course, the admitted patent
answer to this observation is the suggestion that some other fact-
finding device be substituted for the jury when insanity is used as
a defense. Manifestly, there are other devices that could be used,
the issue could be submitted to the judge. Or, it could go to a
panel of "experts," a general plan that has received some usage in
the case of Administrative boards in public utility and labor fact-
law determinations, to cite examples.
But there are those-and the writer is one of them-who refuse
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to give up the jury in criminal cases.10 First, such panels or boards
have not proved altogether successful. Strong, competent men are
not always obtained. Soon, appointment becomes a matter of
political patronage with competence by no means the fundamental
factor in the selection of personnel. Second, but by no means
decisive, is the question of expense, to be added to the taxpayer's
burden. Jury justice is cheap justice; justice according to the ex-
perts would be tremendously more expensive. Third, and this
point is decisive, the jury is much more than a fact-finding device
-it exercises a tremendously important function in criminal cases
in representing the "group mind" of the community. Sheldon
Glueck makes this point in the following language:
The jury is actually not purely a fact-finding de-
vice. If this were the sole function of the jury, no doubt a
better fitted fact-finding instrument could be devised. A
jury's function, in addition to that of drawing conclusions
from more or less conflicting evidence presented by both
sides, is to represent the prevailing public opinion and
morality; a jury, in other words, is a sort of miniature group
mind that reflects the sentiments of the community. If the
jury were merely a fact-finding instrument, then the system
of having juries composed of experts, ought logically to be
extended to every field; and we should have juries of engi-
neers, of veterinarians, of acrobats, and what not."1
In making an appraisal of the existing situation, it is also im-
portant to point out that the law in a minority of states has gone
beyond the Rule in McNaghten's Case. This has been accom-
plished in two ways. First, in approximately seventeen states and
in the District of Columbia, irresistable impulse has been added
to the Rule in McNaghten's Case in defining insanity.'2 Irresisti-
ble impulse may be said to have existed when the actor, although
he knew the nature and quality of his act and that it was wrong,
was nevertheless uncontrollably impelled to commit it.13 The
10 And, attempts to take the issue of mental capacity from the jury in criminal
cases have consistently been held to be unconstitutional. State v. Strasburg, 60
Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910); Sinclair v. State 161 Miss. 142, 132 Pac. 581(1931). See Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime: A Survey, 32 Col.
L. Rev. 933, 952-953 (1932).
11 Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law 465 (1925).12 Weihofen, Insanity As A Defense In Criminal Law 16 (1933). Kentucky
is in this minority group.
13 Moreland, The Law Of Homicide 283 (1952).
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writer is somewhat dubious of this extension of the Rule, although
he does believe that there are some cases where such a condition
does actually exist. The case of William Heirens is cited as an
example. 14 Heirens from the early age of nine showed an ab-
normal and over-powering interest in women's underclothing, par-
ticularly panties. As he grew older this interest became consum-
ing and he was irresistibly compelled to steal and accumulate such
garments. Finally, this off-line sex urge, out of which he obtained
positive sex satisfaction, led him to murder several women when
surprised while stealing such garments. The whole story is bizarre
but there seems to be no other explanation for his extraordinary
conduct.
On the other hand, the writer is of the opinion that actual
cases of irresistible impulse are rare. He believes that many so-
called illustrations of irresistible impulse are really cases of unre-
sisted impulse. In this connection the relation of habit upon the
power of a person to resist a present desire should be considered.
Take, for example, the case of the so-called dipsomaniac, who sup-
posedly has an irresistible impulse to drink. In how many cases
is this simply "habit"? Is habit to be considered a kind of insanity,
one that will constitute a defense to crime? Habits, it is submitted,
may usually be "given up," discontinued. One is apt to become
somewhat wearied at current tendencies to call the drunkard, poor
fellow, the victim of "disease," and so not to be personally blamed
for his continued debauchery. The word "dipsomaniac" sounds
good but perhaps it is largely a sugar-coated label for a confirmed
habit. It is submitted that many of these long-continued habits,
uncontrolled impulses, should be stopped, not serve as excuses
for crime.
One other type of irresistible impulse, kleptomania, an un-
controllable desire to steal, will be mentioned. The writer, like
other persons, obtains his knowledge from two sources, his reading
and his past experiences. He has had a past experience with only
two individuals who might qualify as kleptomaniacs. One has
long ago been "cured" and is now rumored to hold a Ph.D. and
to be a teacher in a southern college. The other came to a bad
end. After terms in reform schools, he served at least one long
14The case is discussed, in detail, id. at 287.
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sentence in prison-for stealing. Recently, after many years, the
writer had a short contact with him. While there may have been
some question as to whether he originally was a kleptomaniac,
there can be no doubt that his mind is now disordered. A long
incarceration in prison has made the matter one of certitude. Of
course, there are not enough "green apples" in these two illustra-
tions to prove anything, but the writer is of the opinion that
neither of these individuals was ever irresistibly impelled to steal.' 5
Second, the Rule in McNaghten's Case has been extended in
another way in a minority group of states by enlarging the defini-
tion of insanity in those jurisdictions to include what is called
"partial insanity" in certain specific instances. This further ex-
tension in the law has not been widely accepted. There are only
two specific instances where this method of enlarging the defini-
tion may be found. The first occurs in those few jurisdictions
where mental deficiency not amounting to complete insanity under
the legal tests'6 may be considered by the jury in determining
whether a homicide has been committed with the deliberation
and premeditation necessary to constitute murder in the first de-
greeY7 Here the law takes an analogy to the cases involving drunk-
enness where it has long been the rule that in crimes requiring
specific intent drunkenness will operate as a defense because the
state cannot make out the intent required for the crime.' 8
While the partial insanity may, in the opinion of the jury,
prevent the state from making out the specific intent and pre-
meditation required for first degree murder, the accused may,
nevertheless, be guilty of murder in the second degree, in spite
of his partial insanity, since second degree murder does not neces-
sarily require specific intent. This new departure is non-scientific
and non-logical, it is believed, since partial insanity should excuse
wholly if at all, but it does have a mitigating effect on the test of
insanity19 and, perhaps, permits some experimentation in the law.20
15 For a more extended discussion of irresistible impulse, see id. at 283-289.16 This includes irresistible impulse in those jurisdictions which have in-
corporated it in the test of insanity.
17 Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting Degree of Crime, 56
Yale L.J. 959 (1947).
18 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, [1920] A.C. 479; Aszman v.
State, 123 Ind. 347, 24 N.E. 123 (1890).
19 This is analogous to the issue whether there is value in dividing murder
into degrees with "premeditation" as the distinguishing factor between murder in
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The other specific instance of the extension of the Rule in
McNaghten's Case by enlarging the definition of insanity to in-
clude what is called "partial insanity" is found in those few juris-
dictions where mental deficiency not amounting to complete in-
sanity under the legal tests may be used to reduce a charge of
murder to voluntary manslaugtter. Thus, in State v. Green,21
the appellate court considered that the record failed to show facts
that would be likely to cause a normal mind to be wrought up
with heat of passion, and, so, the plea of provocation to reduce
the offense to manslaughter was unavailable to the accused. And
yet, the evidence showed that the mind of the defendant was so
wrought up. The court held that this evidence together with
evidence of mental disorder short of legal insanity was sufficient
to entitle the accused to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
The appellate court of Kentucky has subscribed to the mitigating
use of partial insanity to reduce an unlawful killing from murder
to voluntary manslaughter in two cases. 22
While, as stated, the adoption of the twin concepts of "partial
insanity" and "partial responsibility" has not proceeded far in the
criminal law as a matter of case decision, discussion of this method
of alleviating the admitted harshness of the existing tests of "com-
plete" insanity are finding their way into the legal periodicals.23
the first and in the second degree. Cardozo has pointed out that the law has
watered down the word "premeditated" so that no appreciable length of time
need elapse between the forming of the intent and the accomplishment of the
killing. Cardozo, Law, Literature And Other Addresses 97-99 (1931). Justice
Cardozo is right but the division gives the jury an opportunity to consider in-
dividual murderers by their characteristics and the comparative heinousness of
their acts and to make a distinction between them as to punishment. Conse-
quently the division has its values although it is probably unscientific. So, as to
partial insanity in the reduction of murder in the first degree to the second de-
gree. There are values in mitigation and experimentation in such a procedure,
although it may be unscientific.20 One of the strongest arguments for permitting mental deficiency, not
amounting to complete insanity, to reduce the crime from first degree murder to
second is found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy in the case of Fisher
v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 490 (1946).
-2 78 Utah 580, 6 Pac. 2d 177 (1931). Accord, Davis v. State, 161 Tenn. 23,
28 S.W. 2d 993 (1930).22 Mangrum v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 94, 95, 89 S.W. 703, 704
(1897); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W. 813 (1894).23 Perkins, Partial Insanity, 25 J. Grim. L. and Grim. 175 (1934); Taylor,
Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A Commentary on Fisher v.
U.S., 34 Cal. L. Rev. 625 (1946); Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder
Affecting Degree of Crime, 56 Yale L.J. 959 (1947); Note, Premeditation and
Mental Capacity, 46 Col. L. Rev. 1005 (1946).
"Just as intoxication, while not an excuse for crime, may disprove the presence
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Most of these writers are in favor of adopting this enlarging com-
promise rule and, unless a more general solution to the problem
is found, its use may gain additional favor.
B. What of the Future?
Would it be unfortunate if the test of insanity should continue
to be phrased fundamentally as at present? To put it differently,
Would it be better if the "right and wrong" test were repudiated
and abandoned? There are many who do not think so and the
writer himself is unwilling to make such a fundamental change
without more information. One of the most outspoken of the sup-
porters of the test is Jerome Hall, a leader in the field of criminal
law, who after one of the most thorough recent discussions of the
entire problem comes to the conclusion that "the McNaghten
Rules are sound and essential principles of penal responsibility,"
24
although he considers that they should be amended to include
emotional and volitional disorders. If one is looking for a funda-
mental test which has interrelation with our theory of crime and
punishment and which is sufficiently simple in thought and lan-
guage for the average juryman to comprehend and apply, it is in-
deed arguable that he cannot do better than to take the Mc-
Naghten Rules as a basis for his formula. After all, the criminal
law is not the only calling which interprets the fundamental
aspects of human behavior in terms of "right" and "wrong."
Those in philosophy and religion, for example, find a division
according to those terms very useful in evaluating social conduct.
And, while the psychiatrist or psychologist would frame an in-
sanity test in totally different language, they are able to interpret
their knowledge of mental disorder in terms of the existing legal
of some particular state of mind and hence show 'that the less and not the greater
offense was in fact committed,' it would seem possible for mental disorder to be
of such a nature as to produce the same result. The problem may be approached
from another angle, once more limiting the attention to the 'right and wrong
test! of insanity. Since the question is not ability to distinguish right from wrong
in general 'but in respect to the very act,' there would be no legal inconsistency
in the notion that a man suffering from mental disorder of a certain nature could
make this distinction with reference to killing a man but not with reference to
burning a building. If so, he would have criminal capacity to commit murder,
but not to commit arson. It would seem to follow that if he were charged with
first degree murder on the ground that he committed homicide while committing
arson in the first degree, the circumstances might be such as to establish murder
in the second degree only, on the ground that his burning would not amount to
arson." Perkins, op. Cit. supra note 23, at pp. 181-182.24 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 536 (1947).
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test with reasonable accuracy. Because of repeated attacks on the
McNaghten Rules by psychiatrists and psychologists, it has been
assumed that the Rules are totally unacceptable to them. This
is not a correct estimate of the situation. A respectable number
of those learned in these professions are perfectly willing to go
along with the Rules as a fundamental test of legal insanity.25
They do desire, however, to add to or incorporate in the test the
essentials of the concept of "irresistible impulse." It is believed
that the fundamental difference between the test of the criminal
law and that of these learned professions is not so much one of
difference in kind as it is in degree. The psychiatrist and the psy-
chologist would enlarge the category of "insanity" or mental dis-
order, call it what you will, so as to include many more individuals.
The real issue between them and the criminal law is whether this
would be a wise social policy in dealing with those who are charged
with criminal offenses. Or, to put it more bluntly, the issue is
whether "insanity" only should excuse crime or whether some sort
of "mental disorder" should be enough to do so.
But, let us suppose that it seems imperative or advisable to
rephrase the test of insanity which the criminal law uses. Is that
a possibility within the substantive framework of the criminal law
which requires a "mens rea" and a procedural framework which
requires a determination of the issue of insanity by a jury? First
as to the substantive phase of the problem. It is believed that the
time has long since arrived for a substantial repudiation of the
doctrine of mens rea in the criminal law. Fundamentally, society
is interested in one's conduct, not his state of mind. It is the
opinion of the writer that the whole doctrine of mens rea is funda-
mentally unsound. It was not a law doctrine in the first place but
one of ecclesiastical origin. Filched from religious writers in the
twelfth century, it has hung like a millstone around the law's neck
ever since.26
2 See the excellent discussion and citation of authorities as to the opinion of
psychiatrists and psychologists, pro and con, on the legal tests of insanity, id. at
480 et seq.
"It is submitted that the principal objections of psychiatrists are to the
methods of proof and final determination of the issue by the courts rather than the
underlying rules." Note, 39 Ky. L.J. 463, 465 (1951).26 A number of writers have followed Maitland in showing that thephrase
goes back to St. Augustine. See Moreland, Law Of Homicide 5, fa. 20 (1952) for
citations.
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As Holmes, the leading advocate of an objective, as opposed to
a subjective, theory of punishment pointed out-every time he had
the opportunity-the law has numerous instances already where
one is criminally liable if he has knowledge of the facts and should
reasonably know that his act will result in social harm.27 The
leading illustrations are in the field of criminal negligence.28 It is
not urged that the element of mens rea be weeded wholly out of
the law, intended crimes are ordinarily more subject to social in-
dignation than unintended ones, but only that the fundamental
basis of criminal liability be anti-social conduct rather than mens
rea, as at present. The repudiation of the right and wrong test
for insanity could be more easily accomplished, if this step were
taken. Then, if one had the mental capacity to understand the
facts and were a free agent, it might well be the law that he would
be criminally responsible-and a Test in altogether new language
might well be framed, with the cooperation of those in the other
related professions, embodying that principle.
But more difficulty would be encountered with the jury phase
of the problem, it is believed, if it were deemed advisable to
abandon the right and wrong test and to phrase a new one with
the help of the psychiatrists and psychologists. At least that phase
of the problem would be more difficult to the writer who is a
staunch advocate of the jury system. And, up to this hour, at-
tempts to take the issue of mental capacity from the jury in criminal
cases have consistently been held to be unconstitutional.29 Any
progress looking toward an evasion of the jury has been accom-
plished by way of procedural device rather than through frontal
attack.
In some jurisdictions a procedure has been devised which pro-
vides for an examination of the accused by impartial experts where
insanity becomes an issue or in some cases of all of those who are
27 See, for example, Holmes, The Common Law 54 (1881). For his dis-
cussions in cases (applying to negligence) see the citations in Moreland, The Law
Of Homicide 87, fn. 27 (1952). See also, Hall, General Principles Of Criminal
Law 169 (1947). Professor Hall, personally, is in the mens rea group-and, per-
haps, its leading current advocate, although Professor Rollin Perkins, also a prolfic
writer in the criminal law field, has a similar view. See, for example, his thought-
ful book review of the author's Law Of Homicide, 48 N.W. L. Rev. 127, 128
(1953) where he says he and the author are "poles apart" in their divergent
views of the mens rea-conduct theories of criminal liability. He has expressed
approval of the mens rea theory on other occasions.
28 See the author's discussion, The Law Of Homicide 36 and 127 (1952).
29 See the authorities cited in fn. 10, supra.
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charged with certain crimes or who are recidivists on the felony
level. Such statutes have several objectives. One is to eliminate,
so far as possible, the disgraceful "battle of the experts." It is the
purpose of these statutes to retain the use of experts but to provide
a more scientific, impartial examination of persons accused of
crime and a more objective method of presentation of the ultimate
findings to the jury. Under present conditions in most states such
examinations are often given by persons little qualified for the
task, often they are far from thorough. They are generally given
by state employees, often politically selected and poorly paid. On
the other hand such state employees have reasonably sufficient
equipment, all have at least the minimum requisite training and
background and many are competent.
Such procedure is not new. Maine has had such a statute for
more than a hundred years and at least twelve other states have
similar legislation.80 The report of such examination is to the
court but it is usually available to both defense and prosecuting
attorneys. Neither the prosecution nor the defense is denied the
right to put its own experts on the stand but the experts who
made the examination for the court are also available for the trial
and, knowing this, attorneys for the prosecution and for the de-
fense have learned to accept the report in most cases. A somewhat
modified, but similar, procedural approach to the problem is
found in the statutes of about twenty states and in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which expressly authorize trial courts
to appoint experts to examine the defendant when insanity be-
comes an issue and to make a report of the examination.31 The
right to call experts of their own choosing remains in the parties.
A few jurisdictions have evolved a procedural device for the
mental examination of all persons charged with certain offenses.
Such statutes are unique in that they provide for continuing
examinations of such persons. Thus, the Massachusetts statute,
commonly called the Briggs Law and the model for statutes of
this type, calls for a routine examination by state experts in each
case involving a capital offense and certain other crimes. Such
procedures have decided values, they are, however, expensive,
30 Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48
Mich. L. Rev. 961, 965 (1950).
slid. at 963.
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although Weihofen is of the opinion that if such a statute were
limited to persons charged with capital or sex offenses, for ex-
ample, the expense to a state having a state mental institution
would not be very great.32 This is probably under-statement for
experts in such institutions are over-worked now and personnel
would have to be added. Such procedures, however, represent the
most important recent innovation in the handling of the problem
and there is a decided trend toward their extension. 3 Their par-
ticular value lies in helping to make the expert neutral in his
examination of the subject and in his report. This should do
much to restore the expert's self-respect and the confidence of the
public in his report. Whatever else is done toward solving the
problem of the defense of insanity in criminal cases, the partisan
battle of the experts must be ended, if the public is to retain its
respect for the experts and for the courts.
A suggestion is offered at this point. In all the procedural
devices for obtaining a non-partisan report from the experts as to
the mental condition of the accused, or subject, the expense of the
device falls upon the taxpayer. Is there not some way by which
one accused of crime and who is able to pay for such an examina-
tion should shoulder a portion of the expense? Such a person will
pay a large sum for the examination and report of his own par-
tisan expert in such a case. Or, if he is poor, his relatives will pay
for it. It is suggested that it might well be provided by statute
that one who intends to plead insanity shall notify the court of
such intention in advance and whether he is able to retain expert
advice. If so, the court could be empowered to have a non-partisan
expert, representing the state and the defense, examine the accused
and apportion the expense between the county and the defendant.
If a defendant stated that he was unable to pay for an expert,
he should not be permitted to use one then at the trial. Such a
statute would have considerable appeal to those who are interested
in the economics of government. Would it be constitutional?
32Id. at 973.
3 3 
"Twenty years ago, the writer ventured a prophecy: 'Any reform in the
law,' it was said, 'will probably come-and, indeed, is already coming-through
statutory reform in procedure, rather than through judicial revision of the sub-
stantive rules of law.' The prophecy has been vindicated and the statement re-
mains true; the most dynamic aspect of this field of law is that dealing with the
mode of determining the issue." Weihofen, Mental Disorder As A Criminal De-
fense 8 (1954).
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And now, finally, there have been several recent related de-
velopments in this field which have occasioned wide discussion and
speculation. 34 In England, a Royal Commission, reporting in
September 1953,3 5 agreed with only one dissenting voice that "the
test of responsibility laid down by the M'Naghten Rules is so
defective that the law on the subject ought to be changed."36 A
majority of the commission urged the total abrogation of the rule
leaving it to the jury "to determine whether at the time of the act
the accused was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsi-
ble."'37 This recommendation, of course, provides for no test at
all-the issue is left wholly to the jury or other decisive body.
Three members were opposed to the total repudiation of the rules
but favored their extension to hold irresponsible a person who at
the time of committing the act "as a result of disease of the mind
(or mental deficiency) . .. was incapable of preventing himself
from committing it,"38 a proposal the majority of the commission
also believed an improvement over the existing test (the Rule in
McNaghten's Case). This would seem to be a calling for the
situation in the American states which have added irresistible im-
pulse to the Rule in McNaghten's Case as the test in those juris-
dictions. In the United States a very broad recommendation has
been made by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, an
organization which includes influential psychoanalysts, but whose
members are not lawyers. The recommendation reads simply:
"No person shall be convicted... when at the time he committed
the act ... he was suffering from mental illness."3 9 Mental illness
is defined as "an illness which so lessens the capacity of the person
to use.., his judgment, discretion and control in the conduct of
his affairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment to a
mental institution." 40 The writer believes the wording of this
34 See, for example, Insanity And The Criminal Law, A Critique of Durham
v. United States, 22 Univ. Chicago L. Rev. 317 et seq. (1955) (Symposium);
Symposium on Criminal Responsibility, 4 Kan. City L. Rev. 350 et seq. (1956);
Katz, Psychoanalysis and Law, 5 Univ. Chicago Law School Record (No. 2) 13(19"o)
"IBoyal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 (Cmd. 8932) (1953).
3od. at 116. 37 Ibid. 38Id. at 110.
39 Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (3617 W. Sixth Ave., Topeka,
Kansas), Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony, Rep. No. 26,
p. 8 (1954).40 Ibid.
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definition is particularly unfortunate. It undoubtedly goes beyond
irresistible impulse. What is meant by inability to use judgment
and discretion? Many morons would have that difficulty. It prac-
tically puts it within the power of the experts to bring within the
definition and to put away in an institution as "patients" a large
number of those who now walk the streets but excludes the power
to punish them for criminal offenses in the criminal courts. To
such a broad and extended Test the writer is much opposed.
The Report of the Royal Commission has not been acted upon
in England, although it has been subjected to criticism,4 ' but it
has had direct influence upon two American courts. The Supreme
Court of New Mexico in 1954 cited the Report and followed the
advice of the minority of its members in holding that an accused
could not be found guilty if he "was incapable of preventing him-
self from committing"42 the alleged crime. There seems to have
been some quest'ion as to New Mexico's test of insanity prior to
this decision. 43 The case, it seems, definitely adds the state to the
irresistible impulse group. There is nothing exciting about that,
although such jurisdictions remain in the minority.
The other American jurisdiction that has been influenced
by the Report of the Crown Commission is the District of Colum-
bia. Influenced by the Report, which was cited, the United States
Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, undertook to re-
form the District of Columbia common law by enunciating the
criterion to be followed in that jurisdiction as follows: "An ac-
cused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect."44 As pointed out by
the court, this criterion is not unlike that used in New Hampshire
where since 1870 there has been no test for insanity, the issue
simply being left to the jury for their determination without a
test.
45
As stated, this decision and the Report of the Grown Commis-
sion have occasioned keen discussion. Psychiatrists and psycholo-
4 1 Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 Univ. Chic. L. Rev.
367, fn. 2 (1956).
42 State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P. 2d 727, 731 (1954).
43 Note Weihofen's statement of the situation in New Mexico-written before
the White case, Weihofen, Mental Disease As A Criminal Defense 258 (1954).44 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874-875 (1954).
Id. at 874. See Weihofen, Mental Disorder As A Criminal Defense 154
(1954) for a statement of the New Hampshire law.
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gists hail them with enthusiasm; others think they are dangerous
departures. In effect, the rule in the Durham case shifts the
burden from the shoulders of the court to the jury. This, it is
submitted, is most unwise. The jury is less prepared than the
court on the matter. This business of passing tough problems to
the jury is not new, although it has received general disapproba-
tion. It is true that in some states the jury is the judge of the law
as well as the facts, 46 but in most jurisdictions all questions of law
are determined by the court 47 and all questions of faci by the jury.
The jury applies the law as given to it by the court to the facts.
The court cannot evade its responsibility to instruct on the law of
the case by passing the problem to the jury.
But, it is decided in the Durham case that the problem is not
one of mixed fact and law but one of fact only-and so for the
jury. It is submitted that it is most unwise to make the issue of
insanity one of fact wholly. To do so is to leave the issue open to
the subjective emotions, hates, prejudices and other subjective
reactions of the twelve ordinary citizens who compose the Ameri-
can jury. Of course, the net result of such a practice will be that
the experts will testify in terms wholly beyond the ken of the jury
and it will be left without any help or criterion to use in coming
to a decision. This confusion will soon lead to even more pressure
to take the issue of insanity from the jury and to leave it solely to
the experts as a panel or administrative board. At that point the
experts will take over in that jurisdiction.
But, it may be argued, there is a test in the Durham case. If
there is a test it is that the accused must have had "mental disease
or mental defect" at the time he committed the criminal act with
which he is charged, if he is to be excused. The phrase, mental
disease, as a test in and of itself, is a new one in the criminal law.
It might, in time, become illuminated with such judicial interpre-
tation as to become a test-if all criminal insanity were a "disease,"
which it is not. At any rate there is an additional phrase to be
taken into consideration, "mental defect." Note that this phrase
40 For example, in the following statutes it is provided that the jury shall bejudges of the law and the facts: Ga. Penal Code (1933) sec. 1059; IM. State Bar
Stat. (1935) c. 38, sec. 764; La. Code Cr. Pr. (1929) art. 383. See Clark, Crim.
Proc. (2nd ed. 1918) 542-546.
47 It is provided by statute in a number of states, however, that on a trial
for libel, the jury has the right to determine the law and the facts. See A.L.I.
Code of Crim. Proc. page 964. (Draft, June 15, 1930.)
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is used as a correlative to "mental disease." It is this phrase,
"mental defect," which will greatly extend the existing area of
insanity and which will be most objectionable to the legal profes-
sion. Manifestly, it goes far beyond "irresistible impulse."
This brings us face to face with the inescapable fact that only
one-third of the states have been willing to extend their existing
test to cover irresistible impulse. Will any considerable number
of them go even beyond irresistible impulse and adopt a rule that
throws the gates practically wide open? It appears inconceivable
that they will do so. There are persuasive reasons for the unwill-
ingness of the majority of the courts to extend the test of criminal
insanity even to the point of including irresistible impulse. It hap-
pens that the writer is in one of the minority jurisdictions which
has made such extension, and he agrees with it, but the fact re-
mains that it is questionable. As pointed out, supra, in this paper,
many pleas of irresistible impulse are pure sham while many
others represent situations of unresisted impulse or habit rather
than irresistible impulse. But, while admitting this, the writer
has gone along with the extension of the test because it affords a
means of experimentation and because he believes that there are
some cases of irresistible impulse.
And yet, the writer's best illustration of irresistible impulse is
subject to an attack that makes it almost ludicrous. That illustra-
tion is the one involving William Heirens, who had a supposedly
irresistible impulse to steal women's panties which led to the com-
mission of several murders by him when apprehended in such
irresistible quests. Supposedly, if one has an abnormal impulse to
steal panties, which is deep-seated, he is insane. And yet, for the
past five years the newspapers have been full of stories of male
panty-stealers. It has reached the point where it is not abnormal
but normal to engage in such intense, emotional quests, particu-
larly if one is a male and a college student. And now for the punch
line-it may be suggested that Heirens was not abnormal in his
quests for panties but only in the fact that he was too much an
individualist in his procedures!
Admittedly, this is somewhat over-drawn and yet it may well
have a substrata of truth. At any rate the writer is not the only
one who has realized that the panty raids have implications,
whether such conduct is normal or abnormal. Recently a writer
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in the Saturday Evening Post, a magazine for common consump-
tion, offered the following suggestion in an attempt to work out a
method for diverting such irresistible quests:
Eugene Nixon, former professor of physical educa-
tion at Pomona College in California, believes that every
college male should be assessed an extra two dollars each
semester-to buy panties, slips, step-ins, and so on. These
would be framed and hung in the owner's room, so that by
graduation he might possess as many as eight pairs of
female flimsies.
'Panty raids would then become so prosaic,' argues
Professor Nixon, 'that college men would never think of
raiding sorority houses for more undergarments.' But they'd
find other ways of jesting with the jeunes filles.4 8
Quite appropriately, the article was captioned, "Madness On
The Campusl" However, lest some reader take this "college boy
activity" discussion too seriously, let us hasten to say that much
of it is written with tongue-in-cheek. But, let us suggest that it
also contains a deadly serious underlying substrata. Here are illus-
trations of sex motivation that are deep-seated-and perhaps
slightly alarming. For surely, as suggested by the writer in the
Saturday Evening Post, when panty raids are stopped, these young
gentlemen "will find other ways of jesting with the jeunes filles."
The word "jesting" is gross understatement. In conclusion on this
point, it is interesting to note the simple inconsistent fact that
while in the beginning William Heirens was incarcerated in the
Psychiatric Division of the Illinois Penitentiary he has since been
transferred to the General Division.49 Has he been "cured" of his
mental defects?
In spite of our fun the fact remains that William Heirens had
some sort of serious mental maladjustment-and almost certainly
still has it although he is now incarcerated in the General Division
of the penitentiary among ordinary criminals. But, if one of these
college panty-raiders were to commit a serious crime and be
charged with burglary, criminal assault or some such offense which
occurred during a "raid," would the psychiatrists urge that he
should be excused because he was "mentally defective"? That is
the sort of question that inevitably arises in these fringe mental
48 Saturday Evening Post, Apr. 28, 1956, p. 111, col. 2.
40 See Moreland, Law of Homicide 288, fLa. 75 (1952).
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defect cases-and it represents the major point of difference be-
tween the members of the legal profession and the psychiatrists
and psychologists. Those professions want to extend the rule of
excuse too far.
The point may be illustrated by the following humorous
anecdote, clipped from a recent magazine:
The child specialist was giving some advice to the
boy's mother.
'Now, Mrs. Johnson, you're going to have to handle
this child carefully. Remember, you're dealing with a high-
strung little stinker.'-George Heister in Twaddle
If the criminal law were to accept the promptings and urgings
of the psychiatrists, too many "high-strung stinkers" would escape
responsibility for their crimes. Should not individuals like Harry
K. Thaw and Remus be punished for their crimes instead of being
confined as "patients" for a brief period and then released as
"cured"? Recently, in Kentucky, a nineteen year old fringe mental
defective throttled a nine year old neighbor child and threw her
body in a cistern. Shall such people be entitled-like the dog to
his first bite-to one killing? Thousands of these people walk the
streets daily and know that criminal acts are socially wrong. It is
inexpedient to put them all away in institutions at public expense.
Most of them never commit a crime. If one does commit a crime
shall he escape punishment? The majority still say, "No." Most
people are not willing to substitute treatment in a mental institu-
tion for punishment in a penitentiary in such cases.
However, the matter is under intense discussion and change is
in the air. Perhaps that is good. The psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists, members of honored professions, are working on the prob-
lem and making progress. Lawyers should appreciate the difficulty
of their task. It is one thing to determine the nature and extent
of injury where the person examined has suffered a broken leg,
quite another where he is suffering from mental disease or serious
mental defect. "It is difficult to see through the windows of the
mind." But, psychiatrists and psychologists must have patience
with the lawyers too in this matter. Not only are they members of
a conservative profession, they, too, have an obligation to the
community. As Judge Stephen said more than seventy years ago:
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"In dealing with matters so obscure and difficult the two great pro-
fessions of law and medicine ought rather to feel for each other's
difficulties than to speak harshly of each other's shortcomings."50
With patience, understanding, and cooperative effort the various
professions may yet get together on a workable solution to the
problem.
502 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 128 (1883).
